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Abstract: The paper investigates the spontaneous breaking of gauge sym-
metries in gauge theories from a philosophical angle, taking into account
the fact that the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry,
though widely employed in textbook expositions of the Higgs mechanism, is
not supported by our leading theoretical frameworks of gauge quantum the-
ories. In the context of lattice gauge theory, the statement that local gauge
symmetry cannot be spontaneously broken can even be made rigorous in
the form of Elitzur’s theorem. Nevertheless, gauge symmetry breaking does
occur in gauge quantum field theories in the form of the breaking of remnant
subgroups of the original local gauge group under which the theories typi-
cally remain invariant after gauge fixing. The paper discusses the relation
between these instances of symmetry breaking and phase transitions and
draws some more general conclusions for the philosophical interpretation of
gauge symmetries and their breaking.
1 Introduction
The interpretation of symmetries and symmetry breaking has been recog-
nized as a central topic in the philosophy of science in recent years. Gauge
symmetries, in particular, have attracted a considerable amount of inter-
est due to the central role they play in our most successful theories of the
fundamental constituents of nature. The standard model of elementary par-
ticle physics, for instance, is formulated in terms of gauge symmetry, and
so are its most discussed extensions. By most accounts, gauge symmetries
are not empirical but purely formal features of gauge theories1 in the sense
1See [Healey, 2007], Chapter 6, for an in-depth philosophical exposition of the distinc-
tion between empirical and purely formal symmetries that defends the standard account
of gauge symmetries as purely formal.
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that different configurations of the fields involved represent identical phys-
ical situations if they are related by gauge symmetry. Saying that gauge
symmetries are purely formal in that sense is not equivalent to denying that
they may have important empirical significance in a more indirect way. For
recent philosophical work on the interpretation of gauge symmetries see,
for instance, [Redhead, 2002], [Brading and Castellani, 2003], [Lyre, 2004],
[Healey, 2007], [Greaves and Wallace, 2011] (the latter openly critical of the
standard account of gauge symmetries as having no direct empirical signifi-
cance, which is also adopted here).
The present paper focuses on a particular aspect of gauge symmetries,
namely, the notion of a spontaneously broken gauge symmetry. This is a
notion that may seem puzzling at first glance, for it seems natural to ask
what it might mean to spontaneously break a purely formal symmetry that
exists only on the level of our description of physical reality, not on the level
of physical reality itself. The notion of a spontaneously broken gauge sym-
metry is not an exotic notion, however, for it is widely regarded as playing
a crucial role in the generation of particle masses in the standard model of
particle physics by the Higgs mechanism. Although it is almost universally
accepted, the received view of the Higgs mechanism as a case of broken local
gauge symmetry has been criticized by both physicists and philosophers of
physics, see [’t Hooft, 2007], [Earman, 2004], [Healey, 2007], [Lyre, 2008].
’t Hooft, for instance, criticizing it from the point of view of a physicist,
claims that the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is
“something of a misnomer”2, while Earman, from the point of view of a
philosopher, expresses qualms concerning the Higgs mechanism as a sponta-
neously broken local gauge symmetry on grounds that “a genuine physical
property like mass cannot be gained by eating descriptive fluff, which is just
what gauge is.”3 Worries like these about the standard picture of the Higgs
mechanism as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry are aggravated
by a result of lattice gauge theory known as Elitzur’s theorem (see Section 5),
according to which local (gauge) symmetry cannot be spontaneously broken
at all.
In order to develop an adequate perspective on the status of spontaneous
symmetry breaking in quantized gauge theories, Earman proposes that the
question be tackled by means of reduced phase space quantization, an ap-
proach in which, in contrast to the standard approach discussed in Sections
5 and 6 of this paper, gauge orbits (that is, gauge field configurations related
2See [’t Hooft, 2007], p. 697.
3See [Earman, 2004], p. 1239.
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by gauge symmetry) are quotiented out before the resulting unconstrained
system of variables is subjected to a quantization procedure (see [Earman,
2004]). Independently of the success of this enterprise4, it seems reasonable
to ask whether the puzzles surrounding the notion of spontaneous symme-
try breaking in gauge theories might not be resolvable within the standard
“Lagrangean” framework of quantum field theories, as it is actually used by
those working in the field of high energy physics. My aim in the present
paper will be to show that this can indeed be done. A proper assessment
of the role of symmetry breaking in gauge theories that does not merely
recite the standard narrative of the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously
broken local gauge symmetry, arguably, can be given on the basis of the
conventional approach to quantum field theory alone.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls some
basic features of the concepts of (gauge) symmetry and (gauge) symmetry
breaking, and Section 3 discusses the characterization of symmetry break-
ing as a “natural phenomenon” proposed by Liu and Emch5 and considers
in which sense it applies to cases where the broken symmetry is a gauge
symmetry. Sections 4 and 5 assess the fate of the notion of local symmetry
breaking in gauge theories, which, as argued in Section 4, makes sense at the
classical level but is not supported by present-day quantized gauge theories,
as discussed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the breaking of post-gauge
fixing remnant global gauge symmetries and their relation to transitions be-
tween distinct physical phases. It is argued that there seems to be no fixed
connection between these instances of symmetry breaking and phase transi-
tions in that the distinction between broken and unbroken symmetries does
not in general line up with a distinction between distinct physical phases.
Section 7 turns to the more general philosophical relevance of these findings
by considering their implications for claims brought forward in the literature
on philosophical aspects of gauge symmetries and their breaking. The paper
closes in Section 8 with a brief concluding remark.
2 Symmetries, gauge symmetries, and symmetry
breaking
In this section, I give a brief review of the concepts in terms of which the
questions discussed in this paper are formulated. The concepts are those
4See [Struyve, 2010], Section 8 and, in particular, [Struyve, 2011] for recent progress
on it.
5See [Liu and Emch, 2005], p. 153.
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of symmetry, gauge symmetry, symmetry breaking, and gauge symmetry
breaking. Readers who are familiar with these notions can skip the section
without loss, perhaps apart from the last three paragraphs, which review
the phenomenon of Bose-Einstein condensation in a free Bose gas in terms
of broken gauge symmetry.
A symmetry α of a classical system is a transformation α : γ 7→ αγ
of the (coordinate) variables in terms of which its configurations sγ are
individuated that induces an automorphism α : sγ 7→ αsγ ≡ sαγ which
commutes with its time evolution. For a quantum system, a symmetry is
an automorphism of the observables or canonical variables which preserves
all algebraic relations. In analogy to the classical case, possible states of the
system are individuated in terms of the expectation values they ascribe to
these quantities. Time evolution, in the Heisenberg picture, counts as an
algebraic relation among others, so the invariance of all algebraic relations
under a symmetry in the Heisenberg picture implies that the symmetry
commutes with the dynamics of the system.
Gauge theories are defined in terms of an action S that is invariant un-
der transformations which typically correspond to the elements of an infinite
dimensional Lie group and depend on a finite number of arbitrary functions.
As follows from Noether’s second theorem (see [Noether, 1918]), the equa-
tions of motion apparently fail to be deterministic in this case in that their
solutions involve arbitrary functions of space-time. This means, in particu-
lar, that any configuration of the coordinate variables at a given initial time
t0 does not uniquely determine the configuration of variables at a later time
t1. In the physical interpretation of gauge theories, however, determinism
can be restored by assuming that variable configurations that are related
by the symmetry represent identical physical situations. The symmetry is
referred to as a gauge symmetry in this case. Classical electromagnetism
is a paradigm example of a gauge theory in that (assuming the relativistic
formulation in terms of four-vector fields) its action is invariant under local
gauge transformations of the four-vector potential Aµ(x) having the form
Aµ(x) 7→ Aµ(x)− 1
e
∂µα(x) . (1)
Only functions of the gauge fields that are invariant under gauge trans-
formations of the form (1) correspond to physical quantities. The inertial
frame-dependent electric and magnetic fields E(x) and B(x), obtained from
Aµ(x) by taking certain derivatives, are examples of such quantities, and
only these, not the gauge fields themselves nor any other gauge-dependent
quantities, are observable. The quantization of classical gauge theories is
4
most conveniently carried out by means of functional integral quantization,
which provides the basis for the vast majority of physicists’ studies of quan-
tum gauge theories. The framework of functional integral quantization for
gauge theories is briefly sketched in Section 5 and used as the background
of the discussion of gauge symmetry breaking in the quantum context in
Sections 5 and 6.
Symmetries that are gauge symmetries in the sense just discussed are
often referred to as local symmetries, alluding to the fact that the parameters
of symmetry transformations can be chosen “locally”, that is, independently
of each other for distinct space-time regions (see, for instance, the freedom in
the choice of α(x) in Eq. (1)). However, the idea that variable configurations
related by symmetry correspond to identical physical situations applies also
in contexts where the symmetry transformations depend on only finitely
many parameters (though there may be disputes on which contexts these
are), and one speaks of “global gauge symmetries” with regard to these cases,
in contrast to the “local” gauge symmetries discussed before. Only theories
that are formulated in terms of local gauge symmetry are commonly referred
to as gauge theories, however. The present paper adopts this standard use
of terminology, understanding “gauge symmetry” to refer to both local and
global symmetries having the property that variable configurations related
by symmetry represent identical physical situations and “gauge theory” to
refer to theories formulated in terms of local gauge symmetry only.
Having reviewed the notions of symmetry in general and of gauge symme-
try in particular, I now turn to the notion of spontaneous symmetry break-
ing (“SSB” in what follows). The basic idea behind this concept is that
the mapping of the state space onto itself which is induced by a symmetry
transformation does not in general map each single state onto itself. Put
differently, this means that the state of a physical system need not have
all the symmetries which the laws of motions governing its behaviour have.
States for which this is the case are candidates for exhibiting SSB, and for
the purposes of the present paper, where the focus is on ground states and
thermal states of theories with infinitely many degrees of freedom, one may
simply identify them with the spontaneously symmetry breaking ones.6
6See [Strocchi, 2008] for a rigorous textbook account of SSB that avoids both unneces-
sary technicalities and misleading simplifications. Roughly speaking, for a state to exhibit
SSB in the rigorous sense specified in that work, it needs to take an infinite amount of
energy to transform the system from one asymmetric state into another. This is the reason
why realistic systems (that is, systems without any potential barriers of infinite height)
need to have infinitely many degrees of freedom to exhibit SSB. Furthermore, it does not
suffice for a non-symmetric state to differ only slightly from a symmetric one (in the sense
5
For quantum theories, the basic idea behind the concept of SSB just
sketched can be turned into a precise criterion using the language of the al-
gebraic approach to quantum theories. One defines that for a symmetry α of
the algebra of observables of a system to be spontaneously broken by a state
ω, the GNS representations associated with the states ω and α∗ω (defined
by α∗ω(A) = ω(α(A))) have to be unitarily inequivalent.7 Intuitively, this
means that the states ω and α∗ω cannot be written in the form of density
matrices in one and the same Hilbert space H. An expectation value ω(A)
of an observable A for which
ω(A) 6= α∗ω(A) (2)
is called a symmetry breaking order parameter for the symmetry α in the
state ω. Situations where the symmetry α is broken are characterized by
the fact that this quantity is nonzero, whereas it vanishes for states that
are symmetric with respect to α. Symmetry breaking order parameters
in the sense of Eq. (2) can be used to define SSB in contexts where the
algebraic criterion does not apply in that the quantum theory at issue is
not formulated in terms of the algebraic approach. This holds, for instance,
for the application of the concept of SSB in the framework of the functional
integral formulation of quantum theories in which the quantization of gauge
theories is most commonly carried out (see Section 5 of this paper for more
details).
The notion of a spontaneously broken gauge symmetry may seem puz-
zling at first sight. As formulated by Smeenk, “[i]f gauge symmetry merely
indicates descriptive redundancy in the mathematical formalism, it is not
clear how spontaneously breaking a gauge symmetry could have any physi-
cal consequences, desirable or not.”8 Part of the aim of the present paper is
to remove the puzzlement expressed in Smeenk’s statement and to elucidate
the physical significance of SSB for gauge symmetries. For the purposes of
the present section it suffices to clarify the notion of a spontaneously broken
gauge symmetry at a technical level, and to do so, the account just given for
in which, say, a single particle state differs from a zero-particle, fully symmetric, vacuum
state) to qualify as symmetry breaking. Cases like these are automatically excluded by
the criterion in terms of the algebraic approach to quantum theories stated in the next
paragraph.
7For accessible introductions to the notions of algebras of observables, their represen-
tations, the unitary (in-) equivalence of representations, and a state’s GNS representation,
see, for instance, [Ruetsche, 2011], Chapter 13, and [Strocchi, 2008].
8See [Smeenk, 2006], p. 488. See [Earman, 2004], Section 9, for a similar way of putting
the challenge.
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SSB on the level of observables must be generalized by extending the algebra
of observables to an algebra of canonical variables that are not themselves
physical observables. A simple example of a quantum theory with a spon-
taneously broken gauge symmetry is that of Bose-Einstein condensation of
a non-relativistic free Bose gas in the thermodynamic limit at zero temper-
ature.9 Since this theory is formulated in terms of global, rather than local,
gauge symmetry, it does not qualify as a gauge theory, but the spontaneous
breaking of a gauge symmetry can nevertheless nicely be illustrated with it.
In this case, the canonical variables are (quantum) fields ψ(x), and the sys-
tem has infinitely many pure ground states Ωθ, labelled by different values
of an angle variable θ, all of which assign a nonzero expectation value to the
(improper) field operator ψ(x):
Ωθ(ψ) =
√
neiθ, θ ∈ [0, 2pi) , (3)
where n is the average density n = |Ωθ(ψ)|2.
Physically, all states Ωθ defined in Eq. (3) are equivalent to each other
in that they (and their mixtures) yield the same expectation values for all
observable quantities. Gauge symmetry comes into play in the form of an
invariance of the dynamics under global gauge transformations of the form
ψ(x) 7→ αλ(ψ(x)) = eiλψ(x) ,
ψ∗(x) 7→ αλ(ψ∗(x)) = e−iλψ∗(x) , (4)
where λ ∈ [0, 2pi).
The states Ωθ are not invariant under these transformations in that
Ωθ(α
λ(ψ)) = Ωθ+λ(ψ) 6= Ωθ(ψ) (5)
for λ 6= 0, so they break the gauge symmetry and Ωθ(ψ) qualifies as a
symmetry breaking order parameter. As an order parameter testifying to
the breaking of a gauge symmetry it is not itself an observable, though its
modulus
√
n = |Ωθ(ψ)| is. Gauge symmetry breaking is an unavoidable
feature of one’s description if one wants to describe the free Bose gas at
zero temperature in the thermodynamic limit in terms of gauge variables by
means of a pure state, but the states Ωθ, among which one can choose, are
all physically equivalent in that they assign the same expectation values to
all observables.10
9The following presentation relies on [Strocchi, 2008], Chapter 7.2. See also Chapters
13.3 and 13.4 of [Strocchi, 2008] for further details.
10[Leggett, 2006] provides an illuminating discussion of Bose-Einstein condensation in
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3 Symmetry breaking as a natural phenomenon
Spontaneous symmetry breaking, as explained in the previous section, is a
feature of states that do not have the all the symmetries of the underlying
laws of motions (in theories with infinitely many degrees of freedom). In or-
der to interpret the notion thereby defined, let us first focus on cases where
the broken symmetry is one of the algebra of observables (that is, not a
gauge symmetry), so that its breaking manifests itself as an asymmetry on
the level of observables. Having in mind these cases of SSB, Liu and Emch
characterize symmetry breaking by means of the non-technical and intuitive
notion of a “natural phenomenon”11, contrasting it with “merely theoretical
concepts” such as “renormalization, first- or second- quantization.”12 When-
ever the state of a system as specified in terms of the expectation values of
its observables spontaneously breaks some symmetry of the underlying laws
of motion, the discrepancy between the symmetries of the state and those of
the laws is an objective feature of the physical situation described by that
state and not merely an artefact of our description. Liu’s and Emch’s char-
acterization of SSB as a “natural phenomenon” therefore seems adequate
for cases of SSB on the level of observables in that the breaking of these
symmetries, whenever it occurs, is an objective matter and not merely a
conventional or otherwise arbitrary feature of how we represent the physical
situation.13
the absence of the thermodynamic limit that does not operate with the notion of a spon-
taneously broken gauge symmetry. The assumptions underlying Leggett’s approach are
more realistic than those of the discussion made here, since the number of atoms in phys-
ically realized examples of BEC is not exceedingly large (between roughly 103 and 105)
and there are important inter-particle interactions in these systems. Leggett’s “order
parameter” (see [Leggett, 2006] Eq. (2.2.1)), in terms of which he defines Bose-Einstein
condensation, is not a symmetry breaking order parameter in the sense of Eq. (2).
11See [Liu and Emch, 2005], p. 153. Liu and Emch focus on quantum spontaneous
symmetry breaking, specifically, but the characterization of symmetry breaking as a nat-
ural phenomenon does not seem to be based on any particular quantum (as opposed to
classical) aspects.
12See [Liu and Emch, 2005], p. 153, fn. 14.
13Note that to accept the characterization of SSB on the level of observables in quantum
theories as a natural phenomenon, it does not seem necessary to endorse the standard
ontic view of quantum states as states quantum systems “are in”. The main reason
for adopting the alternative, epistemic, conception of quantum states is that it elegantly
avoids the paradoxes of measurement and nonlocality. (See [Friederich, 2011] for more
details and an exploration of how the view might be spelled out in detail.) According
to the epistemic conception of quantum states, quantum states reflect the state assigning
agents’ epistemic relations to these systems, so no such thing as the “true” quantum
state of a quantum system is acknowledged, and SSB cannot be characterized in terms of
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While SSB on the level of observables seems adequately characterized as
a “natural phenomenon” in the sense just discussed, the status of SSB on
the level of gauge variables seems less clear. The reason for this is that gauge
symmetries, as explained in the first section, are purely formal symmetries
that have no physical instantiations. Whenever we describe some physical
situation in terms of broken gauge symmetry, there is thus no discrepancy
between the physical symmetries of the situation and those of the under-
lying laws of motion. This can nicely be seen, for instance, in the case of
Bose-Einstein condensation mentioned at the end of the previous section,
where the gauge symmetry is broken by any of the states Ωθ, but the physi-
cal properties of the system, i. e., the expectation values of observables, are
exactly the same for all Ωθ. There is in this case no asymmetry in the phys-
ical, gauge invariant, properties of the system which the underlying laws of
motion do not have. In just the same sense in which gauge symmetries con-
trast with empirical symmetries in that they have no physical instantiations
gauge symmetry breaking seems to be rather an aspect of how we describe
a physical situation than an objective feature of the situation itself.
One may feel, however, that to conclude from these considerations that
gauge symmetry breaking does not deserve to be characterized as a “natural
phenomenon” in any reasonable sense would be too rash. More specifically,
one may feel that whether some physical system is described in terms of
broken or unbroken gauge symmetry relates directly to objective features of
that system. Even though SSB does not seem to be an intrinsic physical fea-
ture of systems described in terms of broken gauge symmetry in the same
way as it is for systems described in terms of a broken symmetry on the
level of observables, it might nevertheless be regarded as an extrinsic phys-
ical feature of these systems in the sense that their physical characteristics
may strongly differ from those of systems described in terms of unbroken
gauge symmetry. Instances of gauge symmetry breaking, one might want to
say, deserve to be called “natural phenomena” if and only if situations de-
scribed in terms of broken gauge symmetry are qualitatively different from
those described in terms of unbroken gauge symmetry. However, since both
quantum systems’ “being in” quantum states that break some symmetry of the algebra
of observables. Nevertheless, proponents of the epistemic conception of states can hold
that SSB is a natural phenomenon in that an observable called a “witness” of a symmetry
of the observables may have a value that, if known, requires the assignment of a state
that breaks that symmetry. (For an explanation of the notion of an observable being a
“witness” for SSB, see [Liu and Emch, 2005], p. 145.) The characterization of SSB in
quantum theories as a natural phenomenon seems therefore independent of the question
of whether quantum states are conceived of as ontic or non-ontic.
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the notion of a natural phenomenon and that of a “qualitative difference”
between physical situations are only intuitive notions, this idea is in need of
further qualification and should be made more precise.
A natural way of doing so is to say that gauge symmetry breaking qual-
ifies as a “natural phenomenon” just in case the distinction between bro-
ken and unbroken gauge symmetry lines up completely with a distinction
between two qualitatively different physical phases. Physical phases are
regions in the space of parameters characterizing a theory (such as, for in-
stance, particle masses, coupling constants, or temperature) in the interior of
which the expectation values of macroscopic observables (derivatives of the
Gibbs potential), written as functions of the parameters, vary only analyti-
cally. Boundaries between the different phases are called phase transitions.14
Formulated in terms of this notion, the criterion for gauge symmetry break-
ing to qualify as a “natural phenomenon” stated above translates into the
statement that it does so just in case the transition between broken and
unbroken gauge symmetry coincides with a phase transition. Cases of SSB
on the level of observables automatically count as natural phenomena in this
sense, at least if there is a symmetry breaking order parameter in form of the
expectation value of a macroscopic observable, which seems to be the case
in all the typical cases of practical interest. In view of this tight connection
between phase transitions and symmetry breaking it is not so surprising that
the vocabulary of SSB is of crucial importance for our understanding and
classification of phase transitions. An example of a phase transition that
is accompanied by a change of a symmetry from broken to unbroken is the
transition between a ferromagnetic and a paramagnetic phase of a magnetic
material where the total magnetic moment of the system serves as an order
parameter. This quantity is zero throughout the unbroken (“symmetric”)
regime but becomes nonzero in the broken regime and therefore must exhibit
a non-analyticity (that is, a cusp or a jump) where the symmetry breaking
occurs. For the breaking of a gauge symmetry, in contrast, it is not immedi-
ately clear on conceptual grounds whether it is necessarily accompanied by a
non-analyticity on the level of observables, that is, by a phase transition. A
more detailed investigation is required to decide whether specific instances
14Alternatively, one may reserve the notion of a phase transition for the physical process
of crossing a phase boundary. This is the sense in which, for instance, cosmologists speak
of phase transitions in the early universe. For a detailed and rigorous account of phase
transitions in the sense of phase boundaries, see [Sewell, 1986], Chapter 4. Here I gloss
over the difficulties of giving a rigorous account of thermodynamic notions such as the
Gibbs potential in the relativistic, quantum field theoretical, context, assuming that at
least for all practical purposes these difficulties can be met.
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of broken gauge symmetries can count as natural phenomena in that sense.
For the case of Bose-Einstein condensation discussed in the previous sec-
tion this question is settled rather easily. We saw that the ground states
Ωθ break the gauge symmetry α
λ for a free Bose gas at zero temperature.
For temperatures T substantially higher than T = 0, however, the situation
looks entirely different. Above a certain critical temperature Tc one finds
that the expectation value Ω(ψ) vanishes, which may serve as a symmetry
breaking order parameter, signalling that the gauge symmetry is unbroken
above Tc. The most interesting question for present purposes is whether
observable properties of the free Bose gas above the critical temperature Tc
are qualitatively different from those below Tc. Clearly they are: Thermo-
dynamic quantities such as the compressibility of the gas (which is infinite
below Tc in the non-interacting case and nonzero yet finite above Tc) show
qualitative differences below and above Tc, and the temperature dependence
of its specific heat exhibits a cusp at Tc. Since for a free (i. e. non-interacting)
system the many-particle states are just symmetrized products of the single-
particle states, the microscopic origin of these features can be analysed in
terms of occupation numbers of the single-particle states of the free bosons.
For temperatures T < Tc below the critical temperature the occupation
number n0 of the single-particle ground state (that is, the ground state for
a single boson in the same volume) diverges, so that the ratio n0/N remains
finite even when the total number of particles N goes to infinity. At zero
temperature, all particles have “condensed” into the single-particle ground
state, so that n0 = N = n · V , where n is the particle density introduced
in Eq. (3). For temperatures above the critical temperature Tc, in contrast,
n0/N goes to zero as N approaches infinity. The “condensation” of particles
into the single-particle ground state vanishes together with the restoration
of global gauge symmetry, as becomes manifest in the fact that n0/N can be
expressed in terms of the symmetry breaking order parameter. Therefore,
in the case of Bose-Einstein condensation of a free Bose gas the distinction
between broken and unbroken gauge symmetry corresponds exactly to a dis-
tinction on the level of macroscopic observables insofar as situations which
are described in terms of broken gauge symmetry are separated by a phase
transition from situations described in terms of unbroken gauge symmetry.
In Section 6 of this paper I shall argue that this does not always hold for
instances of symmetry breaking in gauge theories so that these do not (in
general) qualify as natural phenomena in the (weak) sense introduced before
in terms of phase transitions.
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4 Local gauge symmetry breaking—the classical
perspective
In this section, I briefly review the textbook account of the Higgs mechanism
in classical terms as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry. To see
the underlying idea, it suffices to consider, as an example, the Lagrangean
of the Abelian Higgs model defined by
L = Dµφ∗Dµφ− V (φ)− 1
4
FµνF
µν , (6)
which exhibits a local U(1) gauge symmetry in that it is invariant under
gauge transformations of the form
φ(x) 7→ eiα(x)φ(x), Aµ(x) 7→ Aµ(x)− 1
e
∂µα(x) . (7)
The covariant derivative Dµ is defined as Dµ = ∂µ+ ieAµ, and the potential
V (φ) in Eq. (6) is given by
V (φ) = m20φ
∗φ+ λ0(φ
∗φ)2 , (8)
where the quartic coupling is assumed to be positive, λ0 > 0. If the coeffi-
cient of the term quadratic in the fields is negative, that is, if m20 < 0, the
potential V has a minimum at a nonzero value of the Higgs field φ, namely,
|φ|2 = −m202λ0 .
In this case, the classical ground states of the theory are configurations
of the fields φ and Aµ of the form
φ(x) = eiθ(x)v/
√
2, Aµ(x) = −1
e
∂µθ(x), (9)
where θ(x) is an arbitrary real-valued function of space and time and v =√
−m20
λ0
. For any two field configurations of the form Eq. (9) there exist
gauge transformations of the form Eq. (7) that transform them into one
another, so all these configurations are physically equivalent. However, since
v 6= 0, the transformations (7) do not act trivially on these configurations,
that is, none of the field configurations (9) is itself invariant under local
gauge transformations. This means that local gauge symmetry is indeed
spontaneously broken in any classical ground state of (6).
In order to extract the physical content of the theory defined by the
Lagrangean (6), it is useful to perform the field redefinition
φ(x) = eiθ(x)ρ(x) 7→ ρ(x) ,
Aµ(x) 7→ Aµ(x) + 1
e
∂µθ(x) ≡ Bµ(x) , (10)
12
which makes it possible to eliminate the θ-field from the Lagrangean, which
thereby becomes
L = ∂µρ∂µρ− V (ρ) + e2ρ2BµBµ − 1
4
BµνB
µν , (11)
where Bµν ≡ ∂µBν − ∂νBµ has been defined.
Expanding the field ρ around its expectation value as ρ = (v + η)/
√
2
and neglecting terms which are of third or higher order in the fields η and
Bµ one obtains
L(2) = 1
2
(
∂µη∂
µη + 2m20η
2
)
+
1
2
e2v2BµB
µ − 1
4
BµνB
µν . (12)
The characteristic physical properties of the theory defined by this La-
grangean can easily be read off in that it describes a massive vector boson
Bµ with a mass MB = ev and a massive scalar boson η with mass
√
−2m20.
The real field θ, which would have played the role of a Goldstone boson
in the case of an invariance under global gauge symmetries, has been elim-
inated, and this shows that there are no massless scalar particles in the
theory. According to how this is often expressed, the Goldstone boson has
been “eaten” by the gauge field. The Lagrangean (12) contains only gauge
invariant fields15, and, from a classical point of view at least, one could have
defined the theory directly in terms of these without introducing gauge sym-
metry at all.16 Classically, as we see, the Higgs mechanism can be spelled
out either in terms of broken local gauge symmetry or without introducing
gauge symmetry in the first place. In the formulation using local gauge
symmetry, as discussed before, it is broken in any classical ground state.
In the electroweak theory part of the standard model the implementation
of the Higgs mechanism is slightly more complicated than in the case just
discussed in that the broken local symmetry is a (non-Abelian) SU(2)×U(1)
symmetry instead of the simpler (Abelian) U(1) symmetry of our example.
Moreover, the SU(2) × U(1) symmetry is not completely broken by the
Higgs field, but only up to a residual U(1) symmetry, which coincides with
the gauge symmetry of electromagnetism. Despite these important con-
ceptual differences, however, the conclusion just established that the Higgs
15Equivalently, one could have arrived at a Lagrangean of exactly the same form by
imposing the unitary gauge θ = 0.
16See [Struyve, 2011] for a detailed discussion of these questions. If one chooses to use
only gauge invariant fields, however, one has to pay careful attention to the constraints for
the variable η occurring in Eq. (12), see [Struyve, 2011], Section 4, and [Strocchi, 2008], p.
194. The analysis in terms of the reduced phase space approach given in [Struyve, 2011],
Section 7, avoids this problem.
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mechanism can be described as a case of a spontaneously broken local gauge
symmetry is not affected and remains correct for the classical version of the
electroweak theory. Leaving aside the classical context from now, I turn to
the fate of spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry in quantized gauge
theories.
5 Quantization without gauge fixing
At present we do not have any rigorous formulation of quantum gauge theo-
ries in the framework of the algebraic approach to quantum theories, so the
status of symmetry breaking in quantized gauge theories has to be discussed
within a different framework. Since functional integral quantization seems
to be the most common and most convenient approach to the quantization
of gauge theories, especially in the non-Abelian case, it is taken as the basis
for the discussion of symmetry breaking in quantized gauge theories in the
present and following sections. The existence of non-vanishing symmetry
breaking order parameter in the sense of Eq. (2) provides the criterion for
SSB in this context.
In the functional integral formulation of quantum field theory, all ex-
pectation values of the observables and fields are obtained as derivatives of
a generating functional W [ηi] that depends on the so-called “source fields”
ηi. In the case of a gauge theory with gauge field Aµ and scalar field φ this
functional can be written as a functional integral (that is, as an integral over
all possible field configurations) of the form
W [η, J ] = N
∫
DφDAµ exp
(
i
∫
d4x(L+ ηφ+ JµAµ)
)
, (13)
where N is a normalization constant, L is the Lagrangean of the theory to be
quantized and S =
∫
d4xL the corresponding action. Correlation functions,
which include the expectation values of gauge-dependent quantities that may
serve as symmetry breaking order parameters (such as 〈φ〉, where φ is the
Higgs field), are obtained from W [η, J ] by taking derivatives with respect to
the source fields η and J and then setting them to zero.
The expression (13) forW [η, J ] involves an integral over all possible con-
figurations of the fields φ and Aµ, which means that each gauge-equivalent
class of field configurations is integrated over infinitely often. As a result,
the integral in Eq. (13) diverges in a “vicious way” in that the inverse free
propagator, a function that is contained in the exponent of the integrand,
cannot be inverted to obtain the free propagator itself that is required as
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a starting point for perturbative calculations.17 Non-perturbative calcula-
tions that do not require the inverse free propagator in the exponent of the
functional integral Eq. (13) to be invertible can be performed by starting
from Eq. (13), but this requires the setting of lattice gauge theory, where the
gauge theory to be quantized is not formulated on the space-time continuum
but rather on a discrete lattice of space-time points.
There are at least two different types of possible reactions to this prob-
lem, which I consider in the present and following sections, respectively.
The first is to choose a non-perturbative route and try to determine physi-
cal features of the quantized gauge theory defined by the functional integral
in ways that do not require a free propagator. For many practical purposes,
the most convenient such approach is lattice quantization, where one con-
siders space-time not as a continuum but as a lattice of discrete space-time
points and extrapolates the results obtained to the continuum case by letting
the lattice spacing go to zero. The second reaction, discussed in the follow-
ing section, is gauge fixing—the insertion of terms in the functional integral
that violate gauge invariance, but in such a way that correlation functions
for gauge invariant quantities are independent of the choice of gauge fix-
ing terms. Since local gauge symmetry is explicitly broken by gauge fixing
terms, one has to consider the option without gauge fixing to assess the fate
of local gauge symmetry breaking in quantized gauge theories. The next
section will focus on the breaking of post-gauge fixing remnant global gauge
symmetries that, depending on the choice of gauge, survive in the presence
of gauge fixing terms.
There are different approaches to determine the properties of quantized
gauge theories without gauge fixing, but the most common framework for
carrying out such computations is lattice gauge theory18, where scalar and
fermion fields are defined on a lattice representing discretized space-time,
and the gauge fields are defined on the links connecting the lattice sites.19 By
17The inverse free propagator of the gauge fields can be thought of as the coefficient
of the part in the Lagrangean L which is quadratic in the gauge fields. For the Abelian
case this part of the Lagrangean is given by − 1
4
(∂µAν − ∂νAµ)
2, and the resulting inverse
free propagator for the gauge field is, in momentum representation, given by ηµνk
2
−kµkν
(where ηµν corresponds to the matrix diag[1,−1,−1,−1]). As remarked in the main text,
the operator ηµνk
2
− kµkν is not invertible, which can be seen from the fact that it has
kν as an eigenvector with eigenvalue zero.
18For an alternative approach that does not use gauge fixing see the version of contin-
uum perturbation theory used in [Buchmu¨ller et al., 1994] to study the electroweak phase
transition in gauge invariant terms.
19For the earliest introduction of lattice gauge models, see [Wegner, 1971]. Lattice gauge
theory as sketched in this paragraph was essentially invented byWilson, see [Wilson, 1974].
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considering finite lattices with periodic boundary conditions the functional
integrals can be evaluated explicitly in a non-perturbative way, so that no
expansion of expressions like Eq. (13) needs to be made that requires a free
propagator for the gauge field. One important virtue of this approach is that
it allows numerical computations that do not require the couplings constants
describing the gauge interactions to be small (as perturbative calculations
usually do), another is that it provides a framework to derive rigorous results.
This sets it off from the continuum formulation, where functional integrals
such as Eq. (13) are used in a mere formal manner without any rigorous
mathematical underpinning. In the absence of gauge fixing terms, local
gauge symmetry persists after quantization, and it is possible to discuss
whether it can be spontaneously broken.
At least according to current state-of-the-art knowledge of quantized
gauge theories the answer to this question is negative: Local gauge symmetry
cannot be spontaneously broken at all in a gauge quantum field theory in
that the expectation values of arbitrary gauge-dependent combinations of
fields are always zero, in particular the expectation value of any Higgs-type
scalar field of the theory harbours such a field. In the framework of lattice
gauge theory this result can be derived in a rigorous fashion and, as such,
is widely known as Elitzur’s theorem.20
As already remarked, in the continuum case the functional integral for-
mulation is not mathematically well-defined, so there exists no rigorous
derivation of an impossibility result for spontaneously breaking local gauge
symmetries in this context. There are no indications, however, that the
impossibility of spontaneously breaking local gauge symmetries might cease
to hold in future continuum formulations of quantized gauge theories one
may speculate about. The crucial feature of local gauge symmetries used in
the proof of Elitzur’s theorem is that for any finite volume of space-time lo-
cal gauge transformations can always be chosen such as to act non-trivially
only in that finite volume (and to reduce to the identity transformation
everywhere else). In virtue of this feature of local gauge symmetries it is
impossible to impose a symmetry breaking order parameter for the local
gauge symmetry by implementing symmetry breaking boundary conditions
on a finite volume boundary and subsequently removing the volume bound-
For a gentle modern introduction to lattice gauge theory, see [Mu¨nster and Walzl, 2000].
20Elitzur proved the theorem for the case of a Higgs field with fixed modulus, see [Elitzur,
1975]. The result was generalized to the case of a Higgs field with variable modulus by
de Angelis, de Falco and Guerra, see [De Angelis et al., 1978]. See [Itzykson and Drouffe,
1989], Chapter 6.1.3, for a useful textbook version of the proof.
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ary to space-time-like infinity.21 Evidently, this feature holds independently
of whether the theory is formulated on a lattice or in the continuum. Any
non-trivial global symmetry transformation, in contrast, acts non-trivally on
the degrees of freedom of all of space-time, not only in a finite space-time
volume. This blocks the derivation of an analogous result for the case of a
global symmetry, so the impossibility of spontaneously breaking local gauge
symmetries according to Elitzur’s theorem is not so much a consequence
of the general unobservability of gauge transformations but has to do with
the specific features of local symmetries. To sum up, while there can be
no mathematical guarantee that local gauge symmetry might not be spon-
taneously broken in some future continuum formulation of gauge quantum
field theory (even though this seems unlikely), the notion of a spontaneously
broken local gauge symmetry is not supported by the leading frameworks of
gauge theory quantization which we presently have.
Recognizing this, one may wonder whether the Higgs mechanism may
perhaps not work as an account of mass generation in the standard model
since textbook expositions of the Higgs mechanism are commonly based on
the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry. Fortunately,
however, as demonstrated by Fro¨hlich, Morchio, and Strocchi22, such fears
are ungrounded, since the physical phenomena which are usually associated
with the Higgs mechanism can be recovered in terms of an approach that
uses only entirely gauge invariant fields. They develop a recipe for con-
structing gauge invariant combinations of the Higgs and gauge fields that
allows to reformulate any gauge theory in terms of such gauge invariant
combinations. Observable quantities, such as the (Yukawa) couplings be-
tween the gauge bosons and fermions in the conventional formulation, are
obtained as functions of expectation values of these gauge invariant fields.
In particular, Fro¨hlich et al. provide a list of gauge invariant quantities that
are non-vanishing and correspond directly to quantities identifiable with
the particle masses in the conventional formulation using gauge dependent
fields. So, mass generation through the Higgs mechanism can get along very
well without assuming a nonzero expectation value for any gauge dependent
combination of fields, in particular not for the Higgs field itself.
One may conclude from the fact that mass generation through the Higgs
mechanism, as demonstrated by Fro¨hlich, Morchio and Strocchi, can be ac-
counted for in terms of gauge invariant fields that to characterize the Higgs
21See [Strocchi, 1985], Chapter II 2.5, and [Fro¨hlich et al., 1981], Section 3, for more on
the importance of this feature of local symmetries in the derivation of Elitzur’s theorem.
22See [Fro¨hlich et al., 1981].
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mechanism as a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is, as Smeenk
puts it, a “relatively benign case of abuse”23 of terminology. An alterna-
tive conclusion to draw, however, would be that the abuse of terminology
involved in characterizing the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously broken
local gauge symmetry is not so benign—after all, the notion is vacuous ac-
cording to our currently best conceptual frameworks— but that despite its
being vacuous the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry
has an important heuristic value, at least historically, and may still be useful
for semi-classical calculations.
Another worry that might be brought up by Elitzur’s theorem is that if
we do not dispose of the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge sym-
metry, we can no longer make the important distinction between cases where
local gauge symmetry is broken and cases where it is unbroken (“restored”).
This distinction, however, is apparently crucial to describe the electroweak
phase transition, a phase transition between two different phases of the uni-
verse as described by the electroweak theory at different values of the fun-
damental parameters such as temperature and the Higgs boson mass. This
transition is widely believed to have actually taken place as temperature
decreased in the history of the early universe so that it supposedly evolved
from a phase where the SU(2)× U(1) local gauge symmetry of electroweak
theory is unbroken to the phase in which we now exist, where that symmetry
is allegedly broken.24 In the phase where the electroweak symmetry is said
to be unbroken (“restored”) the electron and the neutrino are not yet distin-
guishable in that they correspond to degenerate states of one and the same
particle. At the present state of the universe, in contrast, there is obviously
a substantive physical difference between the electron and the neutrino, so
the supposed phase transition seems to have taken the universe from one
phase to another, qualitatively very different, one. Do we have to conclude
23See [Smeenk, 2006], p. 498.
24Detailed calculations (see, for instance, [Kajantie et al., 1996]) have shown that for
values of the Higgs mass not excluded by experiment the electroweak phase transition is
actually not a real phase transition (in the sense of an abrupt change in thermodynamic
quantities) but rather a steep crossover between two qualitatively different regimes of
electroweak theory, meaning that at least some expectation values of observables vary
very strongly (yet analytically) from one regime to the other. In the context of the
present paper, however, the question of whether, for realistic values of the Higgs mass, the
electroweak phase transition is a genuine phase transition or rather a continuous crossover
is not important since we are concerned here with the more general question of whether
the notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge symmetry is needed to give meaning to
the distinction between the high and low temperature phases of the electroweak theory,
which are sharply separated for some values of the Higgs mass.
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from Elitzur’s theorem that the very idea of an electroweak phase transition
rests on an error in that there cannot be a transition from a situation where
electroweak symmetry is unbroken to a situation where it is broken since
electroweak symmetry can never be broken at all?
Fortunately, this conclusion need not be drawn since the electroweak
phase transition, just as the Higgs mechanism itself, can be described in
purely gauge invariant terms. An example of an observable, that is, gauge
invariant quantity that may quite drastically change at the phase transition
is the expectation value 〈φ∗φ〉 (where φ is the Higgs field), which, if displayed
as a function of parameters such as temperature and the Higgs boson mass,
exhibits a “jump” across the planes in the phase diagram where the elec-
troweak phase transition occurs.25 From the fact that phase transitions are
often accompanied by the breaking (or restoration) of certain symmetries
and the fact that the electroweak phase transition is often associated with
“electroweak symmetry breaking” one might mistakenly conclude that there
is an incompatibility between the impossibility of spontaneously breaking lo-
cal gauge symmetries and the electroweak phase transition. As we have just
seen, however, this is not the case, for the distinction between the two dif-
ferent phases, one where electroweak symmetry is allegedly broken and one
where it is allegedly unbroken, can be made in an entirely gauge invariant
way so that the dubious notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge sym-
metry is altogether avoided. Phase transitions are indeed often accompanied
by instances of symmetry breaking, but the definition of a phase transition
in terms of non-analytic behaviour of observable quantities does not require
symmetry breaking. The electroweak phase transition, as we see, is a case
in point.
The topic of phase transitions in gauge theories will concern us again
in the following section while discussing the role of spontaneous symmetry
breaking in the presence of gauge fixing terms.
6 Gauge fixing and symmetry breaking
Having discussed the quantization of gauge theories without gauge fixing in
the lattice formulation of gauge theories, I now turn to their quantization by
means of gauge fixing terms, which makes it possible to perform perturbative
computations using the diagrammatic techniques invented by Feynman in
the continuum as well as on the lattice. In classical gauge theories, gauge
fixing amounts to the implementation of constraints for the Higgs and gauge
25See, for instance, [Buchmu¨ller et al., 1994], pp. 134-6.
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fields such as, for instance, the unitary gauge mentioned in Section 4, which
fixes the phase of the Higgs field at a constant value, say zero, at any space-
time point. For the Higgs field in the Abelian Higgs model discussed in
Section 4, which can be written as φ(x) = eiθ(x)ρ(x), this means setting
θ(x) = 0 for all x. Other choices of gauge fixings that tend to be better suited
for practical calculations include the Coulomb gauge, defined by ∂iA
i = 0
(where the summation is over spatial indices only), and the Lorenz gauge,
defined by ∂µA
µ = 0.
In the functional integral formulation of quantum field theory, gauge
fixing is implemented in the form of field-valued Dirac-δ-functions in the
functional integral. The introduction of these δ-functions can be seen as part
of a change of integration variables involving a Jacobi determinant, the so-
called Faddeev-Popov determinant ∆(A), and it requires, at least in certain
gauges, the introduction of additional, purely formal, fields as integrations
variables. These are the so-called ghost fields, which do not correspond to
any physical degrees of freedom.26 The original gauge invariant action S
of the gauge theory to be quantized (corresponding to the integral in the
exponent of Eq. 13) is replaced by an “effective” action Seff of the form
Seff = S + Sgf + Sghost , (14)
where Sgf implements the gauge fixing in that it contains the gauge fixing
constraint and Sghost is an additional term in the presence of ghost fields.
The gauge fixing term Sgf in the “effective” action Seff explicitly violates
local gauge invariance in that some non-gauge invariant term is inserted in
the functional integral. This is done in such a way that the physical content
of the theory remains unchanged, so the gauge fixing does not have any
physical significance whatsoever. However, the way in which local gauge
invariance is violated by this procedure depends on the choice of gauge fixing
made. One possibility is that the gauge freedom is completely eliminated
by the gauge fixing in the sense that out of any class of gauge-equivalent
field configurations exactly one is singled out by the gauge fixing constraint.
This is the case for the unitary gauge, which, in the case of the locally U(1)-
symmetric Abelian Higgs model discussed before, is given by θ(x) = 0. Here,
local gauge symmetry is eliminated completely (and explicitly) at the level of
the “effective” action Seff , so spontaneous symmetry breaking cannot occur
any more, for there simply is no unbroken symmetry left to be broken.
26This can be seen, for instance, from the fact that ghost fields formally correspond to
spinless fermion fields the physical existence of which is excluded by the spin-statistics
theorem.
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For other choices of gauge fixing terms, however, the action Seff can still
be invariant under symmetry transformations corresponding to some finite-
parameter subgroup of the original infinite-parameter local gauge group. In
the presence of gauge fixing terms of this class, the action Seff still exhibits
certain global gauge symmetries, but no longer a local one. The spontaneous
breaking of global symmetries is not forbidden by Elitzur’s theorem, and in-
deed the breaking of these remnant global gauge symmetries is a common
phenomenon in gauge theories in the presence of gauge fixing. In what fol-
lows, I will refer to it as the spontaneous breaking of “global subgroups” of
the original, local, gauge group or just “remnant symmetry breaking”. It
can also be studied in the formulation without gauge fixing, discussed in the
previous section, by introducing fields which depend on the spacetime vari-
able x not only in an explicit manner, but also implicitly, via an additional
dependence on the gauge fields. An example of such a field is27
Φ(x;A) = g(x;A)φ(x) , (15)
where φ(x) is the Higgs field and g(x;A) is a gauge transformation, which
takes the gauge field into a chosen gauge such as the Coulomb or Landau
gauge. The so defined Φ(x;A) has a nonzero expectation value just in case
the Higgs field φ(x) itself has a nonzero expectation value for the respective
choice of gauge fixing, that is, for the choices mentioned, in the Coulomb or
Landau gauge. It thus functions as a symmetry breaking order parameter for
the remnant global gauge symmetry defined by the transformation g(x;A).
Since we do not presently have any notion of a spontaneously broken lo-
cal gauge symmetry in a gauge quantum field theory, the breaking of these
remnant global subgroups is the only sense of gauge symmetry breaking
that remains to be elucidated.28 To answer the question of whether gauge
symmetry breaking in quantized gauge theories can count as a natural phe-
nomenon in the sense spelled out in Section 3 in terms of phase transitions,
we therefore have to investigate whether the distinction between broken and
unbroken remnant gauge symmetry always lines up with a contrast between
distinct physical phases. We have to ask, in other words, whether the tran-
27The example taken is Eq. (1.1) in [Caudy and Greensite, 2008].
28There are other symmetries besides local gauge symmetries and their global subgroups
which can be broken in quantized gauge theories such as, for instance, chiral symmetry
in QCD or centre symmetry in non-Abelian gauge theories (the centre of a group is the
set of elements which commutes with all other elements), which seems to be linked to the
confinement-deconfinement phase transition, see [Greensite, 2011]. The present paper is
not concerned with the breaking of these symmetries but only with that of local gauge
symmetries and their global subgroups.
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sition from unbroken to broken global subgroups is always accompanied by
an abrupt change in the expectation values of some observables.
Even though there does not seem to be any rigorous statement about the
relation between remnant symmetry breaking and the occurrence of phase
transitions in gauge theories, there is strong evidence, based on a combina-
tion of exact and numerical results, that there is no rigid connection between
the two and that, therefore, remnant gauge symmetry breaking does not in
general qualify as a natural phenomenon in the sense specified in Section 3.
A particularly illuminating discussion of the relation between the breaking
of remnant subgroups and phase transitions is given by Caudy and Green-
site in the context of a study of an SU(2)-symmetric lattice gauge model
with a fixed-modulus Higgs field.29 For this model, there is robust numerical
evidence that there exists, in a limited region of the phase diagram, a phase
transition between a “Higgs phase”, where the spectrum exhibits a gauge
boson mass, and a “non-Higgs phase”, where there is no such mass and the
properties of the model are more similar to those of quantum chromodynam-
ics (QCD) in the presence of confinement.30 The main conclusion drawn by
Caudy and Greensite from their results is that there is no general agreement
between the two transition lines (that between the different phases and that
between broken and unbroken remnant gauge symmetry), even though for
some values of the parameters of the model the transition between the two
phases does coincide with that between a regime where remnant symmetry
is broken and one where it is unbroken.
This conclusion has two distinct interesting aspects the first of which is
that, according to the results reported by Caudy and Greensite, in both the
Coulomb and the Landau gauges, part of the separation line between broken
and unbroken gauge symmetry occurs at parameters where, on grounds of
an earlier exact result due to Fradkin and Shenker [1979], the existence of an
accompanying phase transition can be determinately excluded. According
to Fradkin and Shenker, there exists a continuous path in parameter space
connecting the regime which displays features typical of the Higgs mecha-
nism and the regime which displays features typical of confinement, along
29See [Caudy and Greensite, 2008]. More precisely, their results are for a model with a
fixed-modulus Higgs field in the fundamental colour representation. Their results clearly
show that in a certain range of parameters the system exhibits the typical features of
a “Higgs phase” such as, for instance, the appearance of a massive spectrum associated
with the gauge field degrees of freedom, even though there is no “Mexican hat potential”
(which makes sense only for a Higgs field with a variable modulus).
30See [Greensite, 2011] for an introduction to the problem of confinement that includes
an in-depth discussion of how confinement should be defined in the first place.
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which the expectation values of all observables vary analytically.31 This im-
plies that any phase boundary which partly separates the two regimes must
have an endpoint in parameter space beyond which all expectation values
vary only analytically, analogously to the case of the phase boundary be-
tween the liquid and gaseous phases in a typical phase diagram of ordinary
matter, where beyond the critical endpoint of the phase boundary between
the liquid and gaseous phases the distinction ceases to be sharp and be-
comes gradual. According to the results obtained by Caudy and Greensite,
the distinction between regimes with broken and unbroken remnant gauge
symmetries coincides partly with the phase transition between the Higgs
and confinement regimes, but it continues beyond the endpoint of the phase
transition line into a region of parameter space where no phase transitions
occur and all observables vary smoothly.
Remnant gauge symmetry breaking, to conclude, is not in general linked
to a transition between distinct physical phases as in the Bose-Einstein case
discussed in Section 3 in that the transition between broken and unbroken
remnant subgroups can occur in regimes where all observables vary ana-
lytically. This shows that remnant symmetry breaking is not in general a
natural phenomenon in the sense specified in Section 3. A second interesting
aspect of the conclusions presented by Caudy and Greensite is that, accord-
ing to their results, the values of parameters of the theory for which there is
a transition between unbroken and broken gauge symmetry depend on the
choice of remnant subgroup, that is, if gauge fixing is used, on the choice of
gauge fixing terms. They summarize this observation in the statement that
gauge symmetry breaking in gauge theories is “ambiguous” in the sense that
whether or not remnant gauge symmetry is broken for a specific choice of
parameters in general depends on the (from a physical point of view) arbi-
trary choice of remnant subgroup. This observation illustrates further why
remnant symmetry breaking does not deserve to be called a “natural phe-
nomenon” in that whether or not it occurs for a given choice of parameters
depends on the unphysical (gauge) freedom of description.
In the following section I consider some consequences of the considera-
tions presented in this and the previous sections for philosophical debates
about the interpretation of gauge symmetries and their breaking.
31An interesting line can be drawn from the Fradkin-Shenker result to more recent de-
velopments involving duality in supersymmetric gauge theories and their ramifications for
string theory. See [Intriligator and Seiberg, 1996] for an introduction to supersymmetric
gauge theories that makes this connection.
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7 Philosophical implications
The considerations on gauge symmetry breaking presented in the previous
sections have interesting philosophical ramifications. In particular, they im-
ply that some interpretive claims about gauge symmetries and their breaking
in the literature are misleading. I discuss three examples of such claims.
The first example is Peter Kosso’s contention that broken gauge sym-
metries belong to the class of cases where “the relevant laws of nature are
exactly symmetric, but the phenomena expressing these laws are not.”32
That this characterization cannot really be adequate follows already from
the fact that gauge symmetries have no physical instantiations. If a theory
such as that of the Bose gas discussed in Section 3 has ground states that
break (global) gauge symmetry, all these ground states are still physically
equivalent in that with respect to observable quantities they all assign the
same expectation values. Kosso’s question of why we should think that the
fundamental interactions of nature are “gauge symmetric” even though the
phenomena which we observe are not is misleading since there is no asym-
metry in the phenomena that is not found in the basic laws due to the
fact that gauge symmetries are purely formal and hence unobservable. The
defence of the Higgs mechanism as an account of mass generation in the
standard model may still raise interesting epistemological challenges, but
this has nothing to do with the issue of conjecturing the fundamental laws
to be symmetric in a way in which the phenomena we observe are not.
A number of claims on the nature and role of gauge symmetry break-
ing in gauge theories are based on failure to take into account Elitzur’s
theorem and the fact that whether or not the Higgs field has a nonzero
expectation values depends on the choice of gauge fixing. Margaret Mor-
rison, for instance, argues that the Higgs mechanism is “based on the idea
that even the vacuum state can fail to exhibit the full symmetries of the
laws of physics.”33 As a claim about ideas that have historically played
a role in the development of the Higgs mechanism this statement may be
true, but Morrison argues further that even from a methodological point of
view “one needs the underlying vacuum assumptions regarding the plenum
and degeneracy as part of the ‘physical’ picture.”34 An integral part of this
picture, as she claims, is the thought that here “we are dealing with fields
whose average value is non-zero, where the vacuum is said to have a non-
32See [Kosso, 2000], p. 359.
33See [Morrison, 2003], p. 356.
34See [Morrison, 2003], p. 357.
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zero expectation value.”35 This statement, as we have seen, is not correct in
that, according to our best accounts, the vacuum expectation of the Higgs
field is actually zero in the absence of any gauge fixing in the quantum case,
whereas in the presence of gauge fixing it depends on the choice of gauge fix-
ing which, practical considerations aside, is arbitrary from a physical point
of view. Morrison’s central conclusion that “it would be folly to accept a
robust physical interpretation of the SSB story”36 in the electroweak theory
is quite plausible (depending on what exactly is meant by “robust physi-
cal interpretation”), but the reason she gives for drawing the conclusion,
namely, “that the various vacuum hypotheses which provide the necessary
theoretical foundations are essentially problematic, for both physical and
philosophical reasons”37, is not completely convincing. The problematic as-
pect of the notion of spontaneous symmetry breaking in the context of the
SU(2)×U(1) symmetry of the electroweak theory is not that it is based on a
questionable “theoretical story about the nature of the vacuum”38, but that
the SU(2) × U(1) local gauge symmetry is unbroken in the quantum case
(according to what we now know of gauge quantization at least), whereas
the breaking of remnant subgroups depends on the gauge fixing.
Misunderstandings about the nature and significance of SSB in gauge
theories can be found not only among philosophers but also among eminent
physicists. Steven Weinberg, for instance, argues in a ground-breaking pa-
per on phase transitions in gauge theories that these phase transitions have
the “philosophical implication” as regards the “reality” of gauge symmetries
that “if a gauge symmetry becomes unbroken for sufficiently high tempera-
ture, it becomes difficult to doubt its reality.”39 Weinberg’s reasoning here
seems to be that if gauge symmetries exist in both broken and unbroken
forms in such a way that there is a substantial physical difference between
the two cases (that is, a phase transition that separates them), these symme-
tries are the bearers of non-trivial physical properties and, therefore, must
be real. Although there may be disagreement about the sense in which
gauge symmetries are supposedly established as “real” according to this line
of thought, it seems clear from the considerations presented in the previous
sections that Weinberg’s argument fails, whatever exactly it is supposed to
show, for several reasons. As we have seen, there is no reason to suppose
that local gauge symmetry is ever broken in a quantized gauge theory, so
35See [Morrison, 2003], p. 359.
36See [Morrison, 2003], p. 361.
37See loc. cit.
38See loc. cit.
39See [Weinberg, 1974], p. 3359.
25
one should not expect phase transitions such as the electroweak phase tran-
sition to be described in terms of its breaking and the existence of phase
transitions cannot have any implications whatsoever for the reality of lo-
cal gauge symmetries. Remnant global subgroups of local gauge groups, on
the other hand, may break spontaneously, but their breaking is ambiguous
in that it depends on the gauge and is not necessarily accompanied by a
qualitative change in physical properties. It seems therefore problematic to
regard these global symmetries as the true bearers of physical properties and
thus as “real” in a more substantial sense than the original, local, symme-
tries. The standard view of gauge symmetries as purely formal symmetries
which do not have physical instantiations, in particular, is not in the least
called into question by the result that there are phase transitions in gauge
theories at high temperatures which for certain choices of gauge fixing are
accompanied by restorations of remnant global symmetries.
8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to clarify the status and significance of
gauge symmetry breaking in gauge theories. The classical ground state of
the Abelian Higgs model was presented as an example of a state which, if
described in terms of gauge variables, exemplifies the spontaneous breaking
of local gauge symmetry. Current wisdom of quantized gauge theories, in
contrast, does not support any notion of a spontaneously broken local gauge
symmetry. In the framework of lattice gauge theory, the statement that lo-
cal gauge symmetries cannot be spontaneously broken can be made rigorous
and, as such, is referred to as “Elitzur’s theorem”. Remnant gauge symme-
tries were introduced as global symmetries with respect to which the action
of a gauge theory may remain invariant after gauge fixing. In contrast to
local gauge symmetries, remnant global gauge symmetries may break spon-
taneously. The physical significance of these instances of symmetry breaking
was considered by investigating their relation to transitions between distinct
physical phases. Based on the results of [Caudy and Greensite, 2008], it was
argued that there seems to be no general fixed connection between remnant
gauge symmetry breaking and phase transitions in that, first, a transition
between broken and unbroken remnant gauge symmetry can exist without
any accompanying discontinuous change in the expectation values of observ-
ables and, second, the breaking of remnant gauge symmetry may depend on
26
the choice of gauge fixing made.40
With respect to the Higgs mechanism the following two conclusions can
be drawn from the considerations presented: The first is that the standard
textbook characterization of the Higgs mechanism as a spontaneously broken
local gauge symmetry is misleading according to what we presently know
(even though perhaps useful from a heuristic point of view) in that it is
valid only for the classical, not for the quantum, case. The second is that
while remnant global gauge symmetries may indeed be broken in regimes
that exhibit the typical features of a “Higgs phase”, it does not suffice to
detect the breaking of a remnant global symmetry to establish that these
features actually hold. A direct inspection of gauge invariant quantities
remains necessary.
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